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Health technology appraisal and the courts:
accountability for reasonableness and the
judicial model of procedural justice
KEITH SYRETT*
Reader in Public Law and Health Policy, School of Law, University of Bristol, Wills Memorial Building, Clifton,
Bristol, UK
Abstract : Recommendations issued by agencies undertaking appraisals of
health technologies at the national level may impact upon the availability of
certain treatments and services in some publicly funded health systems, and, as
such, have regularly been subject to challenge, including by way of litigation.
In addition to expertise in the evaluation of evidence, fairness of procedures
has been identified as a necessary component of a claim to legitimacy in
such circumstances. This article analyses the assessment of courts in three
jurisdictions of the fairness of decision-making by such agencies and evaluates
the judicial reading of procedural justice developed in this particular context
against the conditions of ‘accountability for reasonableness’.
1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the widespread establishment of national-level
institutions to undertake appraisal of evidence on the clinical and cost-effec-
tiveness of health technologies,1 in an effort to focus finite public resources upon
treatments which deliver the most effective and efficient forms of care. Although
the final choice on what a health system can afford (as distinct from what is cost-
effective) may reside elsewhere – such as with politicians – the recommendations
which result strongly inform decision-making on access, especially to new health
technologies. Thus, mandatory funding requirements may attach to appraisal
recommendations (as in the United Kingdom), ministers may be precluded from
listing technologies for coverage without a positive agency recommendation
(as in Australia), or the agency may directly determine coverage as regards the
technologies which it appraises (as in New Zealand).
*Correspondence to: Keith Syrett, Reader in Public Law and Health Policy, School of Law, University of
Bristol, Wills Memorial Building, Queens Road, Clifton, Bristol BS8 1RJ, UK. Email: keith.syrett@bristol.ac.uk
1 ‘Appraisal’ may be distinguished from ‘assessment’: the latter denotes the scientific/technical pro-
cess of gathering and analysing information on a health technology, while the former refers to decision-
making or policy advice on that technology, on the basis of a synthesis of the scientific evidence combined
with other factors such as social values (Stevens and Milne, 2004).
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While decisions on the availability of health services and interventions are also
taken elsewhere in the system, the fact that these agencies operate at the national
level endows their recommendations with especially high visibility. This is
exacerbated by the nature of the technologies being appraised, which are
commonly heralded as offering innovative breakthroughs in treatment for par-
ticular conditions. Consequently, the decisions reached by these agencies gen-
erate acute media and public interest and impact upon the interests of a broad
range of stakeholders, including industry, patient groups, political actors and
healthcare professionals.
Given such factors, the work of such institutions is highly politically and
socially contentious and, as such, is especially prone to challenge by individuals,
patient groups and/or industry. One mechanism through which such challenges
may be articulated is litigation. Agencies undertaking technology appraisals in
publicly funded health systems, while usually operating at arm’s length from
direct political control, nonetheless function within a statutory framework
established by the legislature and exercise powers of a public nature which have
been delegated to them by the executive branch of government. As such, they are
susceptible to challenge through the courts, primarily through the process of
judicial review of administrative action. This mechanism – which should be
distinguished from an appeal on the merits of a decision – functions to ensure
that public bodies do not exceed the scope of their allotted powers, that they
understand and apply the law correctly, and that the processes of decision-
making which they operate comply with certain standards of fairness.
This article considers court cases from three jurisdictions, Australia, England
and Wales and New Zealand, in which recommendations issued by national-
level agencies undertaking health technology appraisal functions have formed
the subject matter of challenge. These systems have been selected for two rea-
sons. First, they possess relatively mature institutional processes for appraisal,
with the consequence that sufficient time has elapsed for litigation to have
occurred, although the available ‘data set’ of case law remains small. Second, the
three legal systems possess a shared legal heritage – the common law of England
– which renders identification of common themes and principles a more
straightforward and meaningful exercise than if the analysis were to extend
more broadly: for example, to countries (such as those in continental Europe)
operating within a distinct civil law tradition.
In undertaking such a study, this article seeks to contribute to two issues
raised in the academic literature. First, it provides a further perspective on the
question of whether the decision-making of national-level technology appraisal
agencies may be regarded as fair (Mitton et al., 2006) through analysis of the
judicial approach to fairness – understood as relating to justice in decisional
procedures as distinct from substantive outcomes – which has evolved in cases
involving such bodies. Second, it offers comparisons between the judicial
understanding of the constituent ingredients of procedural justice and the
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dominant conceptual model for the legitimation of decisions on healthcare limit-
setting, ‘accountability for reasonableness’ (Daniels and Sabin, 2008), thereby
facilitating a critical reading of the latter. While the relationship between the
Daniels and Sabin model and judicial review cases concerning access to treat-
ment has been considered elsewhere (Syrett, 2002, 2007), the focus to date has
been upon local allocative decision-making. No analysis has previously been
offered in respect of litigation concerning national-level health technology
appraisal agencies. Given (as previously noted) the central and growing role of
this mode of decision-making within health systems and the significant con-
troversy that it generates in view of its impact upon access, such an investigation
is timely. However, prior to examination and discussion of the relevant case law,
it is necessary first to understand both why procedural justice is viewed as
fundamental to the legitimacy of bodies undertaking allocative functions within
health systems, and why court judgements are worthy of scrutiny in this regard.
2. Limit-setting and legitimacy
Allocative decision-making in healthcare has been widely perceived to give rise
to problems of legitimacy. Where choices are made in situations of scarcity,
which carry significant costs in terms of human suffering, deep-seated moral
conflicts are exposed and suspicion, distrust and resistance may result. Conse-
quently, the authority of the decision-maker is called into question and the
stability of the regulatory regime imperilled (Daniels and Sabin, 2008). In
response to such challenges (or to pre-empt them), bodies whose work impinges
upon the setting of limits to healthcare resources, including those undertaking
technology appraisals, may seek to advance two broad claims to legitimacy. The
first rests upon expertise: legitimacy derives from the methodological rigour
with which the agency approaches its reviewing tasks and the capacity of its
personnel to comprehend and apply the evidence which is presented. The second
rests upon procedural justice: that is, that there is a connection between fairness
of process, legitimacy and acceptance of decisions and that this may be inde-
pendent of any substantive outcome.
Each of these claims to legitimacy would appear to be necessary but not
sufficient. In an analysis of key stakeholder perceptions of technology appraisal
processes in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, Mitton
et al. (2006) note that ‘‘a body of experts that understands scientific evidence
wasy identified as essential to an effective drug review process’’ and that ‘‘all
participants highlighted the importance of using rigorous evidence’’ (2006: 203).
However, the authors also identify transparency as ‘‘crucial to ensuring
accountability and decreasing potential controversy around formulary listing
decisions’’, and the importance of opportunities to revisit and revise decisions
made by the agencies (2006: 204, 206). Relatedly, the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in England and Wales has committed
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itself to a synthesis between expertise and proceduralist approaches in order to
secure legitimacy both for its ‘scientific value judgements’ and for those ‘social
value judgements’, which are inherent in the distributive aspects of its work
(Rawlins, 2005; NICE, 2009).
The leading model of procedural justice in healthcare priority-setting, and
‘‘arguablyy the dominant paradigm in the field of health policy’’ (Friedman,
2008: 102), is ‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’, as articulated by Daniels and
Sabin. This establishes four procedural conditions – publicity, relevance, revi-
sion and appeals and regulation/enforcement – with which bodies should
comply, facilitating ‘‘social learning about limits’’ (Daniels, 2000: 1301) and
enabling a process of public deliberation upon the need for limit-setting and the
criteria that inform it. In short, the accountability for reasonableness model
makes possible deliberative democracy in this context, the latter being seen as a
sufficient condition of legitimate political decision-making (Parkinson, 2003;
Lauridsen and Lippert-Rasmussen, 2009).
This model of procedural justice has been widely endorsed and applied to a
variety of healthcare decision-making environments (Sabik and Lie, 2008). In
the context of processes for technology appraisal, it has been assumed that
compliance will satisfy the procedural component of the claim to legitimacy.
Thus, NICE has contended that, absent substantive consensus upon a basis for
the allocation of resources adherence to the principles of accountability for
reasonableness ‘‘give[s] legitimacy to [its] guidance’’ (NICE, 2009: 13). Simi-
larly, in the academic literature, the model is often ‘‘used as a sort of checklist:
when the procedural conditions appear to be fulfilled, the system in place is
certified as legitimate and fair’’ (Sabik and Lie, 2008: 75): for examples, see
Mitton et al. (2006) and Schlander (2007).
However, this somewhat uncritical employment of the model is problematic.
First, there is a risk that utilisation of the four conditions as a form of inventory
downplays the significance of their function as ‘connective tissue’ to a delib-
erative democratic process, when it is by means of the latter that legitimacy is
ultimately secured. Perhaps more significantly, accountability for reasonableness
has been subject to a number of critiques, which mean that its application is not
uncontroversial. These include arguments that bioethicists should not readily
abandon the search for substantive consensus in favour of agreement on fair
procedures (Ashcroft, 2008); that reasonable people are as likely to disagree
about what amounts to fair procedure as upon substantive principles (Sabik and
Lie, 2008); that a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable decision-
making is difficult or impossible to draw and that what is ‘relevant’ is itself a
substantive judgement (Hasman and Holm, 2005; Friedman, 2008; Lauridsen
and Lippert-Rasmussen, 2009; Rid, 2009); that deliberation lacks practical
feasibility (Friedman, 2008; Lauridsen and Lippert-Rasmussen, 2009); and
that the model is incomplete in underplaying the value of public participation
in decision-making, which may be viewed as a necessary condition for the
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attainment of legitimacy (Emanuel, 2002; Martin et al., 2002; Friedman, 2008;
Sabik and Lie, 2008; Rid, 2009).
3. Procedural justice, legitimacy and the courts
Questions of procedural justice are central to judicial review of administrative
action. The centuries-old concept of ‘natural justice’ expresses the notion that
certain procedural qualities and values are inherent in the very idea of law,
particularly the rule against bias and the right to be heard. Such principles have
been developed through case law and (in some jurisdictions) by legislation, and
are now more commonly captured under a broader rubric of a ‘‘duty to act
fairly’’ (Galligan, 1996: 186). Failure to give effect to this obligation provides a
basis to declare a public body’s decision to be unlawful, with the consequence
that the decision must be retaken in accordance with procedural standards
specified by the court.
Accordingly, when recommendations issued by agencies undertaking health
technology appraisal are challenged by way of judicial review, the articulation of
values of procedural justice will almost certainly form a central component
of the judgement issued by the court. For this reason alone, any evaluation of the
fairness of decision-making processes operated by such bodies is liable to be
incomplete in the absence of analysis of relevant judicial pronouncements. This
is not to argue that a court’s view of the constituent elements of procedural
justice should be regarded as definitive: while legal judgements establish para-
meters for future lawful decision-making (extending well beyond the parties to
the instant dispute), they may subsequently be refined or overruled; furthermore,
what is procedurally just in law may not equate to what is procedurally
just as an ethical or moral matter. Nonetheless, as authoritative, binding and
public statements of institutions accorded constitutional responsibility for the
administration of justice, judgements delivered by courts clearly cannot be
disregarded.
However, accounts of procedural justice in healthcare priority-setting have
generally sought to downplay the judicial role. Notably, Daniels and Sabin
contend that ‘‘courts are ill-equipped to deliberate about issues of limit-setting,
especially about the more technical matters involved in assessing efficacy and
safety’’ (2008: 59), arguing instead that internal dispute resolution mechanisms
should be evolved so as to reduce the ‘‘threat of litigation’’ (2008: 58). Similarly,
Friedman comments that ‘‘endless litigation’’ is a manifestation of distrust and
that people are likely to ‘‘object and fight back with any means necessary,
including litigation, whenever they are disadvantaged for reasons that they do
not understand or do not agree with’’ (2008: 102, 111). Concerns of this type
seem rooted in a view of law as an external autonomous control mechanism
activated by those seeking to challenge the legitimacy of the decision-maker. The
involvement of courts is seen as an unwelcome intrusion into the allocative
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process, especially given the perceived judicial deficiencies in the comprehension
of priority-setting, the procedural unsuitability of adversarial litigation, a rela-
tive absence of democratic credentials and – at least implicitly – a tendency for
judicial inclination towards the individual, which is liable to disrupt the inher-
ently collective task of allocation of finite resources.
While not wholly inaccurate (as noted subsequently, judges frequently admit
to a lack of expertise on the technical questions entailed by technology appraisal
and to limitations to their constitutional remit), this relative neglect or depre-
cation of the judicial role is unsatisfactory. In part this is because, as previously
suggested, any account of the meaning attached by society to procedural justice
is deficient in the absence of consideration of judicial pronouncements on the
matter. In addition, a negative reading of judicial involvement overlooks its
capacity to facilitate, rather than to imperil, the attainment of legitimacy. Court
judgements can render the decision-making process more acceptable to stake-
holders and the wider public as agencies are seen to conform to judicially
articulated principles of ‘good administration’ on matters such as transparency,
participation and accountability. These ensure fair treatment of affected parties
and foster broader public understanding of – and input into – the decision
reached and the criteria upon which it is based (Syrett, 2007).
On this analysis, it might plausibly be argued that a judicial review of
administrative action possesses the potential to fulfil the fourth condition of
accountability for reasonableness, enforcement, that is, regulation to ensure that
the other procedural conditions are met (Syrett, 2002), especially if litigation is
seen both as deliberative in the courtroom setting and as a catalyst for further
public debate outside (Syrett, 2007). However, whether the courts do in fact
enforce the conditions of accountability for reasonableness in relation to
national-level technology appraisal agencies, or instead embrace some other
version of procedural justice, will depend upon how far the three remaining
conditions of the former model can be said to be embodied in the case law, to
which we now turn.
4. The cases
Not all instances of litigation concerning health technology appraisal turn upon
limit-setting coverage recommendations by the agency. Depending upon the
nature of the powers which are legally vested in the agency, cases may concern
matters such as price-setting (e.g. Astra Pharmaceuticals (NZ) Limited vs
Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited [(2000) NZCA 345]), the pro-
duction of clinical guidelines on best practice in management of a condition (e.g.
R (on the application of Fraser) vs NICE [(2009) EWHC 452 (Admin)], or may
relate solely to issues of clinical efficacy (e.g. Commonwealth of Australia and
another vs Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and others
[(1997) FCA 664] and E vs Minister for Health and Family Services [(1998)
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HREOCA 35]). However, as Daniels and Sabin’s work indicates, the question of
the fairness and legitimacy of decision-making arises most acutely in the context
of recommendations whose impact is to limit the availability of a medical
treatment or service on cost grounds, and accordingly the (relatively few) cases
in which such decisions have been challenged in court will be the focus of
consideration here.2
4.1 Australia
Australia’s centralised appraisal agency, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory
Committee (PBAC), was the first of the institutions surveyed here to be subject
to legal challenge. In Pfizer Pty Limited vs Birkett (‘Pfizer’) [(2000) FCA 303/
(2001) FCA 828], the manufacturer of sildenafil (Viagra) challenged the decision
of the Committee not to recommend that the product be made available on the
national formulary on grounds of its cost. Rejecting the contention that PBAC
was not empowered to consider questions of the overall cost of a technology (it
having been argued that such considerations were for government alone),
Mathews J. noted that PBAC was a ‘recommendatory’ rather than an ‘advisory’
body: hence, it was obliged to consider all relevant factors, whether medical or
financial, in fulfilling its function of presenting a desirable course of action to the
Minister, rather than simply offering expert clinical and health economic advice
to the latter (para 88).
However, the judge’s conclusion that PBAC had not acted unlawfully in
taking account of information which was potentially detrimental to the interests
of the manufacturer of Viagra without having informed it that it was doing so or
providing an opportunity to respond, was overturned on appeal. The appeal
court ruled that evidence that an alternative treatment for erectile dysfunction
(alprostadil injections) was used at a considerably higher rate than had been
predicted by the latter’s manufacturer was not merely historical information
bearing no relation to any activity of the manufacturer of Viagra and upon
which it would have been difficult for the latter to make meaningful comment.
Rather, it was ‘‘of central importance to the decision’’ (para 66). Thus, procedural
fairness required that PBAC should have disclosed that it proposed to attach
significance to the information on the overuse of alprostradil. Its failure to do so
deprived the manufacturer of the possibility of persuading PBAC that inferences
should not be drawn as to the likelihood of a similar overuse of Viagra.
In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd vs Anderson [(2003) FCA 617]
(‘GlaxoSmithKline’), a similar claim that there had been a lack of procedural
fairness was rejected on the facts of the case. This case involved a revised PBAC
decision on the anti-smoking aid bupropion hydrochloride which sought to
minimise wastage resulting from failure to complete the full course of 120 tablets,
2 Cases were identified using legal databases (Westlaw, Lexis-Nexis and World Legal Information
Institute). Searches were conducted against the name of the agency, from the date of its establishment.
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recommending instead that funding be provided on the basis of an introductory
prescription of 30 tablets, with the balance of 90 only made available following the
issue of a second prescription. The company contended that it had been given
inadequate notice of the content of certain ‘anecdotal reports’, which had sug-
gested that wastage was considerable and that it had accordingly been unable to
respond to these. Ryan J. held that the company did, in fact, have sufficient
knowledge of the issues which were of concern to the Committee, although it was
not aware of the precise details of the reports. Other arguments advanced by the
manufacturer, which included claims that PBAC was not statutorily empowered to
vary a recommendation that had already been issued and accepted by the Minister
(since this was effectively a means of circumventing parliamentary scrutiny of any
decision to cease funding), that the Committee had formed a predetermined view
and had placed an unjustifiable burden on the company to displace that view, and
that the recommendation had either been based upon no probative evidence or
was against the weight of evidence, were also dismissed. In respect of the last of
these, the judge remarked that ‘‘it is not for this court in circumstances like the
present to go behind the Committee’s evaluation of the preferable policy recom-
mendation for it to make to the Minister’’ (para 51).
4.2 England and Wales
Despite the controversy which has attended a number of the technology
appraisals conducted by the NICE on behalf of the National Health Service
(NHS) in England and Wales, the first legal challenge did not take place until
2007, some eight years after the Institute’s creation. In R (on the application of
Eisai Limited) vs NICE [(2007) EWHC 1941 (Admin)/(2008) EWCA Civ 438]
(‘Eisai’), a pharmaceutical manufacturer (joined by another manufacturer and
a patient group) challenged the decision of NICE to recommend that acet-
ylcholinesterase inhibitors should only be made available for treatment of
moderately severe dementia, thereby excluding the majority of patients from
access to the treatment on the NHS.
As in the Australian cases, a variety of arguments were advanced. A claim that
NICE had not complied with its statutory obligations to promote equal
opportunities and to eliminate discrimination was accepted by the court on the
basis that the guidance issued was insufficiently clear. However, a further
argument that the recommendation reached by NICE was premised upon defi-
ciencies in the understanding and application of the available evidence and
reliance upon outdated data was rejected on the basis that the court was not
competent to adjudicate between competing expert opinions on the evidence.
The primary ground of challenge was, however, that failure by the Institute to
disclose a fully executable version of the economic model which had been
developed to illustrate the cost-effectiveness of the inhibitors was procedurally
unfair. In the lower court, Dobbs J. dismissed this argument, stating that the
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manufacturer had not been deprived of the opportunity to advance suggestions
and concerns in the light of the information which it did possess (para 62).
However, the judge’s finding on this ground was subsequently overturned by the
Court of Appeal, which concluded that procedural fairness did require release of
a fully executable version of the model since, without this, it was impossible to
assess the reliability of the model and to make informed representations upon
this matter to NICE (para 65).
Similarly, in R (on the application of Servier Laboratories Limited) vs NICE
[(2009) EWHC 281 (Admin)] (‘Servier’), a claim on the basis of procedural
unfairness again succeeded. Here, the model had not been disclosed at all, in
view of the existence of an undertaking of confidentiality given by the Institute.
Holman J. nonetheless ruled that NICE was under a duty to take all reasonable
steps to obtain permission to disclose the information and that, on the cir-
cumstances of the case, it had failed to discharge this duty (para 139). By
contrast, those arguments which were not of a procedural nature failed. The
court concluded that the failure to recommend the treatment (strontium renelate
for osteoporosis) did not amount to unlawful discrimination against certain
categories of disabled patients since it could be justified in light of the overall
financial impact upon the NHS, and that the weight to be attached to particular
data was a matter for NICE’s judgement alone, while its decision as regards
this data had been sufficiently and intelligibly explained to a technical reader of
the guidance.
NICE’s failure to disclose an economic model also formed the heart of the
challenge in R (on the application of Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceuticals
Limited vs NICE [(2009) EWHC 2722 (Admin)] (‘Bristol-Myers Squibb’),
involving the treatment abatacept for rheumatoid arthritis. On this occasion,
however, the argument was unsuccessful. While NICE had not released the
modified version of the manufacturer’s original economic model which had
informed the final recommendation that the treatment was not cost-effective,
the court ruled that the company had had full opportunity during the con-
sultation process to make meaningful representations: as the author of the
original model, it had been able to input and run alternative assumptions in a
manner not open to the manufacturer in Eisai (paras 68–70). A further argu-
ment based upon European law (failure to communicate fully to the European
Commission the cost-effectiveness criteria for exclusion of a technology from
coverage by the NHS) was also rejected.
4.3 New Zealand
In Walsh vs Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited [(2008) NZHC 441]
(‘Walsh’), a number of patients challenged decisions made by New Zealand’s
national-level health technology appraisal agency relating to the availability
of Herceptin (trastuzumab) for the treatment of early-stage breast cancer.
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The Pharmaceutical Management Agency (Pharmac) had recommended that the
drug should not be made available on the national formulary for a 12-month
period, but subsequently recommended that funding should be authorised for a
9-week period.
In the High Court, Gendall J. noted that much of the evidence filed by the
patients took the form of criticism of the analysis by Pharmac of the clinical and
cost-effectiveness of the treatment, upon which it was not the place of a court of
law to comment. However, procedural arguments were also raised, pertaining
notably to section 49(a) of the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act
2000, which imposed an obligation upon Pharmac to consult ‘‘when it considers
it appropriate to do so, on matters that relate to the management of pharma-
ceutical expenditure with any sections of the public, groups or individuals that
[in its view] may be affected by decisions on these matters’’. The Agency had not
engaged in any such consultation in advance of its recommendation not to fund
a 12-month period of treatment with Herceptin, on the basis that it was its
standard practice not to consult when declining to recommend a treatment.
Notwithstanding the apparent discretion vested in Pharmac by the statute
(‘when it considers it appropriate to do so’), the judge concluded that such a
practice prevented the Agency from properly discharging its statutory duty. Nor
was this procedural deficiency ‘cured’ by subsequent consultation on the pro-
posal to fund a 9-week period, since this effectively offered a choice between
funding for 9 weeks or no funding at all, rather than reopening the proposal for
12-month treatment. The judge therefore ordered that a process of consultation
on the proposal to decline funding for a 12-month period of treatment be
instigated, while observing that it would be open to Pharmac, following con-
sultation, to reiterate its recommendation not to provide such funding. In such
circumstances, the decision to fund treatment of 9 weeks’ duration – which was
considered to have been lawful – would remain in place.
The process of consultation produced more than 300 responses. Following a
review of these and additional clinical information, Pharmac concluded that no
new information had been presented which demonstrated any additional health
benefit over the 9-week period of treatment, and recommended that funding for
the 12-month period should continue to be declined. However, in December
2008, the incoming National Party administration gave effect to a pre-election
commitment to provide funding for treatment of 12 months’ duration on New
Zealand’s national formulary.
5. Analysis
While one must remain attentive to the differing patterns of evolution of these legal
systems (especially subsequent to independence), the principles of fair procedure
are broadly shared, as is demonstrated by the citation of English precedent in each
of the Australian and New Zealand cases. Given such cross-fertilisation, it is
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possible to construct a judicial model of procedural justice that has resonance
across all three jurisdictions. This section attempts such a task.
Perhaps the most straightforward conclusion which one might draw from
these cases is that decisions reached by national-level agencies undertaking
health technology appraisals are not always compliant with the principles of
procedural fairness as articulated by courts. At a fundamental level, this would
suggest that the answer to the question ‘‘centralisedy review processes: are they
fair?’’ (Mitton et al., 2006) is ‘‘not always’’, at least when fairness is assessed by
way of reference to judicial standards of procedural justice. However, such an
assessment has certain limitations. First, the cases discussed in the preceding
section represent a very small percentage of the total number of decisions taken
by such agencies. It is naively reductionist to draw the inference from this small
data set that the process of decision-making is unfair overall. Second, the rela-
tionship between legality and legitimacy is complex. Pronouncement by a court
that the process of decision-making employed in a particular instance is pro-
cedurally unfair does not necessarily preclude the decision from being accep-
table in the eyes of stakeholders and the general public, although it certainly
renders acceptability considerably less likely.
A further, and perhaps more valuable, observation which might be made as
regards these cases is that fairness or procedural justice occupies a central
position both as a ground of challenge to, and as a basis of judicial appraisal of,
decision-making by these agencies. It is, as noted in Bristol-Myers Squibb, a
‘‘general requirement of the process’’ (para 52). Every one of the cases discussed
in the preceding section involved a claim that fair procedures had not been
followed by the agency in reaching its decision, notwithstanding that a number
of other bases of challenge were also enumerated. More significantly, in all four
instances in which a challenge to the agency was ultimately upheld (sometimes,
on appeal) – Pfizer, Eisai, Servier andWalsh – the sole argument which prevailed
was that based upon lack of procedural fairness. By contrast, arguments per-
taining more closely to the criteria or evidence informing a decision were rou-
tinely unsuccessful. Examples include the claim in Pfizer that the PBAC decision
was improperly based upon the ‘political’ consideration of the overall cost of
Viagra, the argument in GlaxoSmithKline that the same agency’s decision rested
upon inadequate or no evidence, the claims in Eisai that NICE’s understanding
and application of the evidence was defective, the Institute’s alleged failure to
attach weight to relevant evidence in Servier, and the criticisms of Pharmac’s
analysis of the clinical and cost-effectiveness of Herceptin in Walsh.
One explanation for this state of affairs is that it is simply reflective of the
parameters of judicial review of administrative action. Review of the fairness of
decision-making processes lies squarely within the judicial remit, but courts are
not empowered to review the substance of decisions reached by administrative
agencies since this would involve impermissible intrusion upon the merits of
such a decision rather than a mere review of its lawfulness. This is especially
Health technology appraisal and the courts 479
pertinent in the context of allocative decisions in healthcare, in which courts
have traditionally operated a restrained approach to review, given the concerns
as to lack of competence both institutionally (in that they lack expertise on
matters of clinical or cost-effectiveness or the management of resources and/or
the procedural capacity to deal with multifaceted allocative questions) and
constitutionally (in that democratic principles require that decisions on the
merits of allocative choices are entrusted to elected representatives or to une-
lected officials appointed by and accountable to such representatives). The
limitations of the judicial role in this context were clearly articulated in Walsh,
in which Gendall J. observed of the competing merits of the 9-week versus
12-month period of funding that:
it is abundantly clear that there was, and remains, room for more than one view. This
Court cannot sit in its judicial review capacity as though it were entertaining an appeal.
It is in no position to express a view as to which side of the factual argument is correct,
or to be preferred (para 154).
In view of this, it is unsurprising that procedural arguments have tended to
dominate and that, correspondingly, challenges relating to the consideration of
evidence or the criteria used to inform a limit-setting choice, which draw the
courts more closely into an evaluation of the content of a decision, have been
rejected. However, the differentiation between matters of procedure and sub-
stance is not simply a function of the delineation of appropriate judicial tasks: it
can additionally be read as indicative of the courts’ acceptance or otherwise of
the claims to legitimacy advanced by the agency. Viewed from this perspective,
the claim through expertise is regarded as possessing considerable weight, with
the consequence that any aspect of the decision that rests upon the exercise of
expert judgement is virtually immune to judicial intervention. The following
passage from Servier is both illustrative of such a stance and of its inter-
relationship with concerns as to lack of judicial competence:
It is important to stress at the outset that NICE is the specialist, expert body, charged
with making appraisals and decisions of this type. The court is not. I have neither the
right, still less the expertise, to review the decisions as to their substance (para 6).
By contrast, judicial readiness to intervene in questions of procedure indicates
that the claim to legitimacy through procedural justice is regarded with greater
scepticism by the courts. This brings into focus two key questions: what are the
components of the judicial model of fair decision-making process as applied to
agencies undertaking technology appraisals and how do these compare to the
conditions of accountability for reasonableness?
The first point to be noted is that the absence of judicial scrutiny of issues
relating to the substance or content of the agency’s decision effectively excludes
the ‘relevance’ condition from the ambit of the courts. In these cases, courts
impose no constraints on the types of reasons, values or evidence which are
advanced by agencies as the basis for coverage recommendations so as to ensure
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that these are ‘‘accepted as relevant by people who are disposed to finding ways
of co-operating with each other on mutually acceptable terms’’ (Daniels and
Sabin, 2008: 51). This does not mean that we should dismiss the ‘relevance’
condition as a component of a fair and legitimate decision-making process,
although it does lend weight to the critique that this condition is, at base,
substantive rather than procedural in character. Rather, the issue of ‘relevance’
is, for reasons of lack of judicial competence and/or deference to expertise,
left to the agency’s discretion and does not form part of the judicial model of
procedural justice.
Second, it is clear that the courts regard transparency as important when
evaluating the procedural fairness of a decision reached by such an agency. This
is perhaps most evident in the cases regarding NICE. In Eisai, the Court of
Appeal drew attention to the ‘‘strong public interest’’ in the work of the Institute
given its vital role in determining availability of treatments on the NHS, which
NICE had recognised through ‘‘its acceptance of the need for a very high degree
of transparency in the process’’ (para 34). The Court commended the Institute
for the fact that there was ‘‘already a remarkable degree of disclosure and of
transparency in the consultation process’’ (para 66). Likewise, in Servier, Holman
J. stated that ‘‘NICE is always under a duty and imperative of transparency and
fairness’’ (para 115) and observed that it must ‘‘keep firmly in mind the high
importance of fairness and transparency’’ (para 123).
Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, it was NICE’s own commitment to trans-
parent decision-making, as evidenced in its documentation (cited in Servier,
paras 45–47), which created a space for findings that it had acted unlawfully in
failing to fully disclose the models upon which the recommendations had been
premised. Thus, in Eisai, the Court of Appeal commented that the commitment
to transparency ‘‘cuts both ways because it also serves to underline the nature
and importance of the exercise being carried out. The refusal to release the fully
executable model stands out as the one exception to the principle of openness
and transparency that NICE has acknowledged as appropriate in this context’’
(para 66). Similarly, in Servier, the judge held that while exceptionally it might
be permissible to give undertakings as to confidentiality in order to ensure the
quality and robustness of the appraisal process (e.g. to enable the Institute to
maximise access to information in view of the fact that some material was
commercially sensitive or that its use might prejudice future academic pub-
lication rights), nonetheless, the high importance attached to transparency
placed NICE ‘under some duty to ‘‘press’’ ’, that is to ‘‘particularly strive to seek
permission to disclose the economic model and/or the data contained therein’’:
which duty he concluded had not been discharged (paras 121/123).
While the courts have not emphasised the importance of transparency in such
explicit terms elsewhere, it is notable that non-compliance with an obligation to
disclose the information upon which the decision was based also formed the
rationale for judicial intervention in Pfizer and was cited as a ground in both
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Bristol-Myers Squibb and GlaxoSmithKline, although the courts in the latter
cases determined that sufficient information had been provided. It is also pos-
sible to construe the Pharmac practice of non-consultation in which it had
reached a decision to decline to recommend the technology in question as
indicative of an absence of transparency, notwithstanding that it was not con-
ceptualised in this precise manner by the court in Walsh.
There is a superficial parallel between the judicial conceptualisation of fair
procedures in this regard and accountability for reasonableness, which Daniels
has recently characterised as requiring ‘‘transparency for all aspects of the
[priority-setting] process’’ (2008: 330). However, it is important to identify the
precise role which commitment to transparency as a principle of procedural
justice serves in the Daniels and Sabin and judicial conceptions respectively. In
the former, transparency primarily takes the form of the ‘publicity’ condition
which – by allowing for public accessibility to limit-setting decisions and their
rationales – facilitates consistency in decision-making by evolution of a body of
‘case law’ and fosters understanding of the need for limit-setting in healthcare
and the criteria upon which such choices may be based, thereby opening up the
prospect of a process of public deliberation. While there is some judicial
acknowledgement of the latter rationale in Servier in which Holman J. notes
that NICE must have regard to ‘‘the importance of the respective information
to understanding the appraisal’’ (para 123), in the same case the court also
observed that, while NICE should provide reasons for its guidance, they need
only be sufficient to explain to a ‘‘technically informed reader’’ why the Institute
had reached a particular conclusion (para 178). This suggests that transparency
is not predominantly perceived by the courts as a value which has ‘educative’
utility in fostering broad understanding of the limit-setting implications of
health technology appraisal as the basis for a public deliberative exercise.
Rather, the primary function of transparency in the judicial model appears to
be to facilitate stakeholder participation in the initial decision-making process.
This connection is, again, most readily apparent from the cases on NICE. In
Eisai, the court held the refusal to release the fully executable version of the
model to be unlawful because it limited the ‘‘ability to make an intelligent
response on something that is central to the appraisal process’’ (para 66) of
consultees (i.e. organisations invited by NICE to take part in a technology
appraisal, who can submit evidence, comment on appraisal documents and
appeal the final determination). Similarly, in Servier, the judge required NICE to
disclose the economic model to all consultees and to ‘‘permit all consulteesy to
make further submissions or representations in response to that disclosure’’, noting
that ‘‘NICE must give due consideration to [issues arising as a result of any such
submissions] and, if it thinks fit, further revise the Final Appraisal Determinations
in the light of it’’ (para 230). By contrast, in Bristol-Myers Squibb, the failure to
disclose the modified model was not unlawful as this had not affected the ability of
the company to make informed representations (para 71).
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It might be concluded from this that participation in decision-making is
regarded by courts as the dominant value of procedural justice and that trans-
parency merely serves a secondary role in enabling such participation to be as
meaningful and useful as possible. The Australian cases lend support to this view
in that, as previously noted, the need for disclosure of information is not
explicitly conceptualised as required in the interests of transparency, but is seen
as necessary to enable the making of informed representations to the agency.
Thus, in Pfizer, the appeal court held that the failure on the part of PBAC to
inform the manufacturer that it intended to take account of the information on
the usage rate of alprostadil was unlawful because (in the words of the summary
of reasons attached to the court’s judgement) ‘‘the Committee was obliged both
to inform Pfizer that it intended to take into account certain information that
was potentially detrimental to Pfizer’s interests, and to allow Pfizer an oppor-
tunity to respond to that information’’. In GlaxoSmithKline, the opposite con-
clusion was reached on the facts, but the reasoning employed was similar, Ryan
J. making the following observations:
A Committee of experts is entitled to draw upon its own expert knowledge provided
that it has properly considered the evidence before ity Nor need the content of its
expert knowledge be exposed to a person affected although such a person must have an
opportunity to contradict relevant material before the Committee which is prejudicial
to that person’s interestsy The present Committee was clearly obliged to give the
applicant an opportunity to respond to its concerns, however they might have arisen,
and to suggest that despite the superficial attraction of the Committee’s initial
hypothesis as a matter of ordinary logic, there were matters which weighed against it
being correct (paras 37/38).
This passage offers a clear indication of the somewhat limited conception of
participation which is articulated by the courts in this context. Participation is
seen in essentially adjudicative terms: it is concerned with presentation of proofs
and argumentation by the parties to a decision with a view to persuading the
adjudicator (decision-maker) to rule in favour of that party (Fuller, 1978). The
scope of participation is narrow, being restricted to stakeholders directly
affected by a decision or, in the case of NICE, to consultees who have been
invited to take part. Furthermore, its function is relatively specific. The courts
consistently emphasise that affected parties should be able to understand what is
at issue, to present evidence and arguments and – perhaps most clearly – to
respond to or rebut opposing arguments. For example, in Eisai, the court
remarks upon the need to ‘‘check and comment on the reliability of the model’’,
to ‘‘check whether there are variables to which the model is particularly sensitive
and make informed representations accordingly’’ and to ‘‘challenge the relia-
bility of the model’’ (paras 49/50/66); in Bristol-Myers Squibb, the court
acknowledges that disclosure of information might be necessary in order for the
company to ‘‘comment upon they report in order to undermine the higher
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios’’ and to ‘‘effectively examine and challenge
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[the] report’’ (paras 59/61); in Pfizer, the court notes that the manufacturer ‘‘was
deprived of the possibility of persuading the PBAC that the experience in respect
of alprostadil injections would not be repeated should sildenafil not become
available as a pharmaceutical benefit’’ (para 67); while in GlaxoSmithKline, the
decision was not unlawful because ‘‘there were no factual matters relevant to the
Committee’s finding against the applicant upon which the applicant was denied
an opportunity to comment’’ (para 43).
How does this compare with accountability for reasonableness? As previously
noted, that model as originally conceived does not accord great significance to
participation in limit-setting decisions and to this extent it may be differentiated
from the judicial approach. The latter is also distinct from the model of pro-
cedural justice favoured by some of Daniels and Sabin’s critics, who envisage a
much broader range of direct public involvement in the process of reaching
limit-setting choices. For example, Sabik and Lie call for an ‘‘open commentary’’
upon coverage decisions and argue that ‘‘empowerment means involving in the
initial discussions both the general public and people who will be affected by the
decisions, not just the decision-makers within the system’’ (2008: 83; see also
Friedman, 2008; Rid, 2009). It is clear that the judicial approach does not go
this far.
The judicial conception of participation does have some commonalities with
the modified position adopted by Daniels and Sabin in recent work, in which it
is contended that ‘‘consumer participationy increase[s] the likelihood that a
broader range of relevant reasons and rationales will be aired in the decision-
making process and thus strengthens the existing conditions of accountability
for reasonableness’’ (Daniels and Sabin, 2008: 62). It may be argued that,
similarly, the objective of the courts is to ensure that the agency is in possession
of information which it might not otherwise have acquired and that it is thus
able to make a balanced and, as far as possible, ‘correct’ decision based upon
full knowledge of all relevant facts. To this end, participation connects to the
‘relevance’ condition in that it serves to reassure stakeholders that the decision is
based upon relevant criteria, including their own responses to the evidence
provided by the agency. However, there are at least two differences between the
models. First, participation occupies a more central position in the judicial
reading of procedural justice than is the case even in the modified version of
accountability for reasonableness, where it appears as something of an after-
thought: certainly, and in contradistinction to the courts, Daniels and Sabin
regard participation as being of subsidiary importance to transparency. Second,
whereas Daniels and Sabin are clear that engendering a ‘‘deliberative process at
the point of decision-making’’ (2008: 63) is not a substitute for a broader process
of public deliberation upon limit-setting, through which legitimacy is ultimately
obtained, there is no indication in the English and Australian cases that the courts
view participation as a principle which has value outside the original decision-
making arena. It operates purely to enable reasoned argumentation, evidence and
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proofs to be presented to the agency by the parties and does not function as a
means of ‘‘modelling a wider deliberation [or] educating the public’’ (Daniels and
Sabin, 2008: 63).
Only Walsh appears to stand as a partial exception to this narrow judicial
conceptualisation of participation. Here, although Gendall J. noted that the
extent of consultation was a matter lying within the discretion of the agency, he
held that it was unlawful not to consult at all prior to reaching the decision upon
funding for Herceptin, especially in circumstances where there was ‘‘known
wide and continuing public interest by groups, organisations or individuals
likely to be considerably affected by a decision’’ (para 189). He offered further
indication of the meaning which he attached to the process of ‘‘wide public
consultation’’ (para 204), which he considered should have taken place before
rejection of the 12-month period of funding, in stating that:
Consultation does not require ultimate agreement, nor does it involve negotiation.
Consultation does not require or involve an ongoing dialogue over a protracted per-
iodyConsultation requires open-minded communication and hearing the voice of
others who are given the opportunity, and right, to be listened to (para 207).
While it might be objected that ‘consultation’ differs from ‘deliberation’ in that
a deliberative approach is more reflective and open than consultation (which is
normally ‘top-down’ in orientation and in which scope for public reasoning and
communication may be tightly constrained by a restricted range of policy
options), the reference in this passage to ‘open-minded communication and
hearing the voice of others’ and the degree of public input envisaged by the judge
do suggest a broader reading of the participatory dimension of procedural
justice than is apparent in the Australian and English cases. Of course, factors
peculiar to the litigation inWalsh may explain the difference. The litigants were
patients, rather than pharmaceutical companies (although it should be noted
that patient groups had joined as interested parties in two cases against NICE).
Furthermore, as previously noted, the particular statutory framework under
which Pharmac operated imposed a duty to consult (albeit one which permitted
considerable discretion in interpretation) in much clearer terms than apply either
to PBAC or NICE. Nevertheless, Walsh does demonstrate that the potential
exists for courts to adopt a more open, deliberative conception of participation
in future cases of this type, should they choose to do so.
There is little by way of explicit statement which may be extrapolated
from these six cases which casts light upon the judicial approach to the third
condition of accountability for reasonableness, appeals/revision. Here, various
models exist in practice: NICE has an internal appeals process, PBAC an
independent review process, and Pharmac no formal process at all. At common
law, the absence of such a process is not in itself unlawful, though if an appeal
mechanism is provided, it must be procedurally fair. However, more generally,
the judicial reading of transparency and participation articulated in these cases
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appears precisely designed to ensure that alternative arguments and additional
evidence are presented with a view to the agency revisiting (albeit not necessarily
altering) its decision, as it will be obliged to do in order to comply with the
court’s ruling. Where litigation occurs, therefore, the court may demand internal
reconsideration of the original decision on the basis of arguments and evidence
which were not initially presented because of inadequacies in the realisation of
transparency and participation, even where no formal appeal mechanism exists.
While not as potent as the internal dispute resolution process required by
Daniels and Sabin, this approach nonetheless evinces a similar judicial concern
for the right to put one’s case against the original decision, with the prospect of
revision of the latter.
6. Conclusion
This survey of litigation in three jurisdictions demonstrates that questions of
procedure occupy a dominant position in judicial scrutiny of national agencies
undertaking health technology appraisals, just as they do in much of the lit-
erature on healthcare resource allocation in general. Although generally defer-
ential to the exercise of expert judgement by such agencies, the courts cast a
much more critical eye over the processes by which decisions are reached and
have proved willing to declare limit-setting choices which do not comply with
judicially articulated values of procedural justice to be unlawful. While it would
be misleading to conclude from the small number of successful legal challenges
that the decision-making processes of these agencies are generally unfair, it
would be equally mistaken to ignore judicial pronouncements in light of the
weight which these carry as societal yardsticks of procedural fairness and the
legal obligation of compliance which attaches to them.
The judicial approach to procedural justice in cases involving national-level
technology appraisal agencies differs from accountability for reasonableness in two
important respects. First, the proscription of judicial intrusion into the merits of a
decision largely precludes enforcement of the ‘relevance’ condition, except in so far
as imposition of a participatory obligation connects to this condition. The judicial
reluctance to regard this as a component of procedural justice lends weight to the
claim that this condition is, at base, substantive in character. Second, participation
plays a more prominent part in the judicial conception than it does in the original
Daniels and Sabin model, with transparency being subsidiary and valued primarily
for its capacity to facilitate stakeholder input. This suggests that those critiques of
accountability for reasonableness which emphasise the importance of participation
as a dimension of procedural fairness possess merit, notwithstanding that these
appear more deliberative in orientation than the essentially adjudicative model
generally adopted – at least, to date – by the courts.
While such distinctions in approach do not invalidate accountability for
reasonableness (especially in view of the fact that health technology appraisal is
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just one setting in which this framework has been applied), they do underline
the importance of adopting a critical reading of the model and of avoiding too
ready an assumption that the fairness of limit-setting decisional processes can
be measured by a simple, perfunctory application of its conditions. Given the
virtual inevitability of future litigation involving bodies conducting health
technology appraisals, continued attention to judicial scrutiny of decision-
making processes in this field will remain imperative in order to develop a
comprehensive appreciation of the meaning of fairness and legitimacy in this
contentious area of modern public policy.
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